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REVIEW 
 
Judith Revel, Michel Foucault: Expériences de la pensée (Paris: Bordas, 2005), 
ISBN: 2047299446. 
 
In this path-breaking volume, Judith Revel sets herself the task of constructing a 
‚genealogy of Foucault’s thought‛ (12); a genealogy, then, of the thinking of a figure 
whose own métier was genealogical inquiry.  For Revel, there is an ‚internal cohe-
rence‛ to what so many have seen as the ‚radical discontinuity of the Foucauldian 
way [parcours+‛ (12), a coherence due to his reading of history as radically ‚discon-
tinuous,‛ filled with breaks and leaps, so that ‚<the only imaginable constant is that 
of a discontinuity understood as continuous change...‛ (33)  Those breaks and leaps 
upon which the Foucauldian genealogies focus, involve the plurality of épistémès, 
and the successive transformations in the ‚rules‛ for ‚speaking truth‛ *dire-vrai], in  
power relations, and the government of others, and in the construction of subjec-
tivety.  According to Revel, it was the reading of Nietzsche that was the key to Fou-
cault’s critique of a linear and teleological vision of history contained in a certain 
reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, in his rejection of a trans-historical vision of the 
subject contained in phenomenology (Husserlian and Sartrean), and in his distance 
from structuralism, with which Revel claims Foucault was never enmeshed.  For 
Revel, then, Foucault’s preoccupation was with ‚the irruption of a non-necessary 
‘singularity’‛ in history: the event.  It is genealogy that makes it possible to proble-
matize our own reality, to question the singularity of the historical forms and modes 
of a given social, economic, political or cultural complex or network [dispositif], and 
to constitute what Foucault designated as a ‚critical ontology of ourselves.‛  
 
One of those historical breaks that a Foucauldian genealogy delineated occurred in 
the West in the nineteenth century, with ‚<the emergence of a series of bio-powers 
applied both to individuals in their singular existence and to populations< and 
finally the appearance of technologies of behavior [that], therefore, form a configu-
ration of power that, according to Foucault, is still with us at the end of the twentieth 
century.‛ (155)  These bio-powers, congealed into a ‚biopolitics‛ that constitute 
nothing less than new power relations based on the political administration of the 
life of whole populations based on normalization, the birth of what Revel terms a 
‚social medicine,‛ indeed a new mode of assujettissement or subjectification, and new 
modes of govenmentality.  
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Two conceptual problems arise here in Revel’s scintillating account of the Foucaul-
dian way, one that she herself explicitly raises, and one that seems to me to arise 
from her own account.  
 
For Revel, Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitics designates two very different, though 
clearly linked, historical developments.  On the one hand, biopolitics designates the 
way in which new power relations are constituted in the nineteenth century, new 
modes for the government of individuals and populations, and new modes of 
subjectification.  On the other hand, Revel points out that for Foucault, biopolitics 
‚also designates – inversely – the manner in which it is possible to respond to those 
powers [pouvoirs] over life, that is to say, the conditions of possibility for a practice of 
freedom that would be rooted in a power [puissance+ of life.‛ (232-233)  That Foucault 
uses the same term, biopolitics for a mode in which one governs others, and for a 
mode in which one can resist that government, is an important insight, one that 
readers of Foucault need to utilize.  However, Revel here implicitly raises another, 
no less important issue, when she speaks of powers over life and power of life, and 
uses two different terms to designate them, pouvoir and puissance.  The French lan-
guage, like Latin, makes such a distinction, but it is completely lacking in English, 
which raises a problem both for translators and readers of Foucault.  Pouvoir as 
power over and puissance as power to, the former linked to domination, norms, and 
control, the latter linked to creativity, productivity, and resistance, each play impor-
tant and distinct roles in the Foucauldian way or path, roles to which Revel has 
alerted us.  In philosophy and political theory that distinction has an important 
history, shaping Spinoza’s Ethics, for example, or Antonio Negri’s Empire.  
 
Not only does Revel show that puissance is the response to pouvoir, but she also raises 
the prospect, explored by Foucault with his ethical turn, around 1980, that puissance is 
linked to the possibilities of ‚an invention of self *invention de soi] and of self with 
others.‛ (229)  But here, a conceptual and linguistic problem of her making seems to 
arise.  Revel utilizes the term subjectivation for the construction of human beings as 
subjects, both as ‚objectivized‛ *objectivés] subjects, and as ‚constituting oneself as a 
subject of one’s own existence;‛ as the subject that is assujetti, subjectified, and as the 
subject that arises from ‚a certain number of self-techniques.‛ (174)  It not only 
seems to me that using the same term to designate two different modes through 
which the subject is constituted can sow confusion, but that Foucault himself used 
different terms to designate these very distinct ways in which the subject shows up.  
Indeed, in the index to Foucault’s Dits et Écrits, subjectivation makes its appearance 
only with the final Foucault, with what Revel terms his ‚double perspective, ethical 
and aesthetic.‛ (210)  When Foucault spoke of power relations, government of 
others, discipline, control, normalization, he spoke of assujettissement, for which sub-
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jectification seems an acceptable translation.  It is certainly the case that subjec-
tification is not simply domination or control; that it contains resistance, the resis-
tance of the one who is subjectified, as one of its elements.  And, as Revel com-
pellingly shows, it is in the resistance to power [pouvoir], in struggle, that practices of 
freedom can pass over to an invention of self; and to that other history, ‚<a history 
of modes of subjectivation.‛  However, a clearer linguistic or terminological demar-
cation would clarify that precise point. 
 
Revel’s book, in my view, may well be the most important work on Foucault’s trajec-
tory to have appeared since Dreyfus and Rabinow’s Michel Foucault: Beyond Structu-
ralism and Hermeneutics.  Though it lacks Foucault’s own role as a third ‚writer,‛ 
which is such an important component of that earlier work, Revel’s volume takes 
Foucault’s parcours from a history of épistémès and dispositifs to the history of the 
invention of self, permitting us to see the whole sweep of the Foucauldian way.  One 
can only hope that this book will be soon translated into English, and spark new 
debates. 
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